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Abstract
The main thesis of this article is that the Holocaust is indispensable for
understanding Israel’s treatment of what it perceives as the greatest
current threat to its security - the Iranian nuclear program. The
Holocaust’s impact deviates in crucial ways from established teaching
regarding balance of power in general and nuclear deterrence in
particular. Mutually Assured Destruction, the distinction between
capabilities and intentions, and even linkage politics - all of those basic
concepts are profoundly altered in the Israeli case by the (often
conscious) presence of the Holocaust. The Holocaust’s influence is
evident in the Israeli belief that deterring Iran might be impossible: MAD
does not apply to the Iranians since, like Hitler, their regime is
considered mad: its commitment to destructing the “Zionist entity” is
understood as trumping any standard realpolitik calculations. This
perception of Iran generates the conviction that the Iranian nuclear
project must be stopped at all costs: Israel must prepare for the
possibility that the Jews will once again be left alone and, if need be,
launch a strike against Iran to prevent a potential second Holocaust.
There will not be time for “accommodation” to the threat.
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Introduction
We, the Air Force pilots in the sky of the camp of atrocities, have risen 
from the ashes of the millions of victims, carrying their silent outcry, 
salute their bravery and promise to be a defender of the Jewish people 
and its land, Israel.
— Israeli Air Force Brigadier General Amir Eshel's radio 
transmission to the ground, Auschwitz, September 4, 20031 
This article aims to contribute both to the study of Israeli politics and to 
deterrence literature. Despite extensive research on Israeli society and 
government, covering almost every event in the country's short history, 
Abstract
The Holocaust stands at the core of Israel's security policy, and especially 
at the core of Israel's treatment of what it perceives as the greatest current 
threat to its security—the Iranian nuclear program. The Holocaust fuels 
the Israeli conviction that deterring Iran might be impossible. This con-
viction makes it very likely that Israel will be willing to use whatever 
means necessary to try and stop the Iranian nuclear project, including, if 
all else fails, a preemptive military strike.
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comparatively little scholarly attention has been given to broader pro-
cesses of Israeli policy formation, and specifically to the Holocaust's 
impact on these processes.2 These processes deviate in crucial ways from 
established teaching regarding balance of power in general and nuclear 
deterrence in particular. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the dis-
tinction between capabilities and intentions, and even linkage politics—all 
of these basic concepts are dramatically altered in the Israeli case by the 
(often conscious) presence of the Holocaust.3 The Holocaust's influence is 
evident in the Israeli belief that deterring Iran might be a doomed strat-
egy: MAD does not apply to the Iranian regime, which is not only engag-
ing in brinkmanship but is also willing to go past the brink in order to 
achieve a messianic goal that offsets any possible cost. Far from being 
"merely" a revisionist actor that seeks geopolitical prominence, the Ira-
nian regime is considered by Israeli decision makers a fanatic actor: its 
commitment to the destruction of the "Zionist entity" is understood as 
trumping any standard realpolitik calculations.4 Israel must therefore be 
prepared to launch a strike against Iran to prevent a potential second 
Holocaust.
The discussion of this Holocaust-imbued sense of threat is circumscribed 
in three ways. First, no claim is made as to the empirical accuracy of the 
Israeli perception of the Iranian menace: what matters is the existence of 
this perception itself, which, given the tremendous impact of the Holo-
caust, must be taken into account in any sound prediction of Israeli 
actions. In addition, unlike many discussions which tend to stress that 
"policymakers ordinarily use history badly,"5 no attempt is made here to 
prescribe policy, the main reason being that one must first adequately 
understand a phenomenon before judging its merits and weaknesses. 
Lastly, little comparison is offered with other nuclear deterrence cases, 
since there is good reason to think that the Israeli case is distinctive. 
While other countries have shown extraordinary anxiety in the past over 
nuclear proliferation, Israel is the only state that has struck—already 
twice—an enemy's nuclear facility, and might very well do so again for a 
third time.6 
Fear and Nuclear — the Holocaust as a Fixed 
Analogy from Ben Gurion to Begin
The Holocaust's place at the heart of Israeli security policy results from a 
distinct analogical process. Historical analogies are routinely employed 
by individual and collective agents when confronting new conditions, 
which are compared to a past situation, retrieved from memory. Standard 
analogical reasoning requires at least some degree of flexibility: if all new 
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issues are represented using the same past memory, then the agent is 
"locked" into the same psychological construct and is unlikely to acknowl-
edge the need for adaptation. Such a cycle characterizes not standard but 
rather what can be termed a fixed analogy. Collective traumas, of which 
the Holocaust is the quintessential example, are an important source for 
fixed analogies.7 
The living influence of the Holocaust as a fixed analogy in Israeli collec-
tive consciousness, and specifically in its security doctrine, has been per-
vasive throughout Israel's short history. "Israeli national security policy," 
as Chuck Freilich notes, has always "been predicated on a broad national 
consensus, which holds that Israel faces a realistic threat of genocide, or 
at a minimum, of politicide."8 A historical survey of this consensus and its 
nuclear implications is important as background for discussing the Israeli 
view of Iran's nuclear plan.
The earliest and most significant example of the Holocaust as a source of a 
fixed analogy is David Ben Gurion, Israel's founding father, first Prime 
Minister, and Minister of Defense. Three lessons Ben Gurion deduced 
from the Holocaust are especially pertinent for understanding the foun-
dations of Israel's security doctrine throughout the decades. The first was 
self-reliance: the Jews must never place on others their hopes for salva-
tion. Ben Gurion, in the words of Shlomo Aronson, perceived the Jews, 
the Jewish national movement, and the state it built against all odds as "a 
unique historical phenomenon" which was to remain deeply fragile "for a 
long time to come."9 The second lesson was the absolute necessity of 
avoiding even a single defeat: Israel's foes can always bounce back from a 
loss to fight another day, while Israel does not have such a luxury: each 
round of warfare must be literally seen as a matter of collective, not only 
individual, life and death. Third, the strategic solution to the deep imbal-
ance between Israel and its enemies lies in nuclear deterrence as the best 
guarantee against a second genocide.
Ben Gurion always remained deeply concerned about Israel's security 
environment, even given supposedly reassuring circumstances, whether 
military—such as the success of the 1956 Sinai Campaign—or diplomatic. 
Though he considered it pivotal to obtain the support and cooperation of 
great powers, Ben Gurion refused to rely on promises of foreign assis-
tance in the case of an Arab-initiated conflict. When meeting almost any 
foreign leader, Ben Gurion belabored the catastrophic implications of a 
surprise attack, with the conclusion that Israel must always prepare for 
the worst and rely solely on itself. "If Nasser should break Israel's air 
force," American ambassador Walworth Barbour quoted Ben Gurion, "the 
war would be over in two days."10 
Nili: The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Journal of Strategic Security
40
This remark captured a key feature not only of Ben Gurion's psyche but 
also of the national one, as evinced by the fact that the necessity of nuclear 
deterrence was widely accepted in Israel. Ever since the 1950s, as Avner 
Cohen emphasizes, "the idea of the nuclear weapons program as a safety 
net has enjoyed almost total national consensus in Israel."11 This consen-
sus and the fears that grounded it remained dominant even after Ben 
Gurion himself had retired from office (for the second and last time) in 
1963. The 1967 "waiting period," for example—the three weeks prior to 
the Six Day War—is etched in Israeli collective memory as a time when 
the fear of national catastrophe was extraordinarily tangible. Graves were 
dug for as many as tens of thousands in preparation for the impending 
battles; Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was perceived as fatally indecisive, 
and at the height of the crisis stuttered in a crucial radio speech, produc-
ing widespread distress. "Those who were born after the war," as Cohen 
recently recalled, "cannot grasp how profound was the anxiety that took 
over Israel. Two decades after the end of the Second World War, one gen-
eration after the Holocaust, many of Israel's active citizens were them-
selves survivors." All this took place while the Jewish State was still within 
the boundaries of the 1949 armistice, which even Israel's most famous 
foreign minister, the dovish Abba Eban, would later term the confining 
"Auschwitz borders."12 
These shadows of the Holocaust disappeared only temporarily with 
Israel's historical success in 1967 and the euphoria that ensued. Merely six 
years later, following the surprise Arab invasion of the Yom Kippur War, 
complacency was abruptly replaced with returning fears of doomsday, 
captured in the behavior of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the hero of 
the previous victory, who was quoted as declaring the "destruction of the 
Third Temple." Whether or not their knowledge of Israel's nuclear capa-
bilities pushed the Arabs to limit their war aims, the fact that such 
destruction did not come about in 1973 was understood as a result of the 
IDF's recovery, not of any Arab restraint.13 The notion that even a single 
defeat could be fatal was as strong as ever. Despite the eventual complete 
reversal of battlefield conditions in Israel's favor, Israeli public discourse 
in the post-war period was dominated by the feeling that an irrevocable 
disaster was only marginally avoided (a feeling evinced by unprecedented 
protest against the country's political and military leadership).14 
The corresponding fear that another disaster could be looming was mani-
fest during Menachem Begin's tenure as Prime Minister (1977–1983), as 
was the Holocaust's psychological presence. Despite signing Israel's peace 
treaty with Egypt, Begin never put Auschwitz aside. The most important 
example was his fateful decision to launch an air-strike against the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor in Osirak (June 1981). Begin explicitly understood the 
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threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Holocaust-laden terms, as demon-
strated most clearly in his declaration that he would "not be the man in 
whose time there will be a second Holocaust."15 
However, this similarity between Ben Gurion and Begin, though main-
taining the essence of Ben Gurion's Holocaust lessons, was not complete. 
Begin went beyond these lessons in one significant sense, also pivotal to 
the current Israeli posture towards Iran. Begin certainly adopted the 
necessity of self-reliance, as well as the notion that a single defeat in battle 
would be fatal for the Jewish state. But the combined impact of these two 
convictions now cast in a different, more skeptical light, Ben Gurion's 
third Holocaust lesson: the supreme importance of nuclear deterrence. 
Ben Gurion did not have a nuclear weapon at his disposal; Begin quite 
clearly did—but he did not consider it reassuring enough. Begin, then, 
established the view that Israeli nuclear capabilities cannot be seen as a 
sufficient deterrent against regimes whose intentions towards the Jewish 
state are understood, as a matter of certainty, to be the worst imaginable, 
just like those of the Nazis towards the Jewish people.16 The Osirak strike 
was a direct consequence of this genocidal threat perception, generating 
the Begin Doctrine: "a clear and unequivocal consequence of the Holo-
caust," in the words of Arie Naor, Begin's Cabinet secretary, asserting that 
"the State of Israel would never allow an enemy country that aspires to 
destroy it to develop, manufacture or purchase weapons of mass 
destruction."17 
Following Sadat's peace initiative in the late 1970s, Israel's geopolitical 
circumstances changed; yet in many ways, the sense of collective threat 
underlying the Begin Doctrine remained as entrenched as before. Many 
Israelis have persisted in maintaining that despite the peace with Egypt, 
and later with Jordan (1994), Israel's security environment is not mallea-
ble—that the region's hostility is "so pervasive and extreme as to preclude 
any ability to materially alter the nation's circumstances through either 
military or diplomatic means."18 Many Israelis continue to believe that 
there is little need for representation of "new" security issues since they 
are in effect, old: they are all are handled using Auschwitz as the "source 
memory," making threats from different time periods and regimes mesh 
together into a single menace of politicide. The overriding majority of 
Israel's public, in Anita Shapira's words, has "seemingly accepted hatred 
of Jews and hatred of the State of Israel as existing phenomena."19 
It is important to see why this acceptance and the existential fears 
resulting from it are not simply an echo of the overriding realist concern 
with survival. Israel's national security considerations cannot be 
described as operating according to a standard realist calculus. This 
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calculus, after all, dismisses "emotional belief"—one, as Jonathan Mercer 
recently put it, "where emotion constitutes and strengthens a belief and 
which makes possible a generalization about an actor that involves 
certainty beyond evidence."20 Such a belief is generally considered by 
realists an irrational factor that should play no part in national security 
deliberation.21 It is hard to think of a stronger emotional belief than the 
fixed Holocaust analogy.
To evince just how deep is the gap between the realist reading of global 
politics and the Holocaust-driven Israeli sense of threat, consider, for 
example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli view of national 
existence as inherently fragile has been evident even in the representation 
of Palestinian threats that cannot possibly be considered as existential in 
the basic, physical sense of collective survival.22 Even when not conceiv-
ing of Palestinian terrorism as an existential threat in that sense, public 
opinion has certainly perceived it as endangering Israel's survival as a 
cohesive and functioning state—"a challenge to the very fabric of its soci-
ety."23 Seeing that existential fears are pervasive even in the face of clearly 
inferior military capabilities, it is little surprising to witness these fears in 
the context of much more severe security challenges. Rhetoric about the 
"destruction of the Zionist entity" or "pushing Israel into the sea" has 
been defining Israel's worst-case scenario for decades regarding all its 
enemies—from the Egyptians to the Palestinians. It is this fear, as Cohen 
notes, which was "the original motive for Ben Gurion to pursue nuclear 
weapons, and it has remained the strongest incentive for Israel to main-
tain its nuclear weapons program."24 But when it comes to the Iranians, 
the Israeli nuclear program is not understood as sufficiently deterring.
Here lies the most profound difference between Israeli security concep-
tions and the traditional realist understanding of nuclear deterrence: 
Israeli decision making does not accept the realist distinction between 
capabilities and intentions. Not only capabilities are known; from an 
Israeli point of view, intentions are always known as well. Millennia of 
Jewish history, tragically culminating with the Holocaust, are taken as a 
guarantee of this knowledge. Of course, a realist might respond in Hobbe-
sian spirit that there is little difference between "assuming the worst 
intentions"—that the other side might endanger your survival at any given 
instance—and claiming to have certainty regarding the other's intentions. 
But there surely is a difference in the case before us. Israeli decision mak-
ing is based on the unwavering conviction that the desire to destroy the 
Jewish state is the paramount and overriding interest of its enemies. 
These enemies therefore cannot be deterred, even by nuclear means, pre-
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cisely because of their fanaticism. This is certainly a disturbing fact when 
it comes to suicide bombers; and, from the Israeli point of view, it is an 
especially petrifying fact when connected with the messianic intentions of 
the Ayatollahs' regime in Teheran, to which I now turn.
The Fixed Holocaust Analogy and the Iranian Bomb
This section has two main purposes: first, to demonstrate the degree to 
which the fixed Holocaust analogy dominates Israel's perception of Iran's 
nuclear project; and second, concurrently, to show why Israel might not 
be satisfied with American assurances of massive retaliation in case of an 
Iranian strike, or even with its own second strike capability—and why 
there is therefore a distinct possibility that it will attempt a preemptive 
strike, despite unprecedented technical difficulties and potential geopolit-
ical implications.
Much of the official Israeli approach to the Iranian nuclear project derives 
from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's explosive rhetoric 
regarding Israel, Zionism, and the Holocaust. In an October 2005 Tehe-
ran conference on a "world without Zionism" (which Ahmadinejad him-
self had convened), for instance, he declared Israel a "disgraceful stain" 
which must be "be wiped off the map,"25 just as in 2008 he reiterated that 
the "Zionist Regime" is a "germ of corruption" and "a cancerous tumor" 
that "should be wiped off the map."26 Only the most recent statement in 
such spirit came in June 2010, when, commenting on the Israeli Gaza flo-
tilla raid, Ahmadinejad declared that "The devilish sound of the uncul-
tured Zionists was coming out from their deceit... They were holding up 
the flag of the devil itself."27 
Ahmadinejad has also been drawing connections between the "Zionist 
regime" and the supposed fabrication of the Holocaust. In a June 2009 
speech in which he labeled the "Zionist entity" as "the most criminal 
regime in human history," Ahmadinejad also insisted that the Holocaust 
is a "great deception."28 Three months later, Ahmadinejad proclaimed 
that Israel was created on the basis of "a lie and a mythical claim," and 
that the Western powers "launched the myth of the Holocaust. They lied, 
they put on a show and then they support the Jews."29 These words only 
echoed Ahmedinjad's broader adoption of anti-Semitic prejudice. Speak-
ing to the UN General Assembly in September 2008, Ahmadinejad 
exclaimed that Zionists are "acquisitive," "deceitful," and dominate global 
finance despite their "minuscule" number; and in January 2009 he 
added:
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"Today the Zionists dominate many of the world's centers of 
power, wealth, and media. Unfortunately, they have ensnared 
many politicians and parties, and they are plundering the wealth 
and assets of nations in this way, depriving peoples of their free-
doms and destroying their cultures and human values by spread-
ing their nexus of corruption."30 
In light of this (merely partial) list of speeches, it is hardly surprising that 
Ahmadinejad's words have been officially condemned by the West 
throughout his presidency as "totally abhorrent," "blatantly anti-Semitic," 
and having "no place in civilized political debate."31 
It is even less surprising that Israel takes Ahmadinejad's threats most lit-
erally, first and foremost because of its firm conviction that, just like Nazi 
Germany, Iran is a fanatic actor. Among the numerous Israeli leaders 
across the political spectrum who have been emphasizing the grave dan-
ger posed by Teheran's messianic intentions, Shimon Peres is a highly 
symbolic example. Currently Israel's President, Peres was one of the initi-
ators of Israel's nuclear program, but has come in recent decades to be 
considered an icon of the Israeli peace camp. A Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
following the Oslo Accords (1994), who earlier did all he could to dissuade 
Begin from striking Iraq,32 even Peres declared Iran in 2005 "the most 
dangerous country around, because the mullahs believe their religion is 
superior, not unlike Hitler believing the Aryan race superior."33 
No other Israeli leader, however, treats Iran in Holocaust terms more 
than Israel's current Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu's 
2009 speech to the UN General Assembly is a particularly important 
example. Its repeated connections between the Second World War and 
the Ayatollahs' regime indicate the lasting dominance of the Holocaust 
analogy in Israeli consciousness. Netnayahu stated:
"The United Nations [w]as founded after the carnage of World 
War II and the horrors of the Holocaust. It was charged with pre-
venting the reoccurrence of such horrendous events…Yesterday, 
the man who calls the Holocaust a lie spoke from this podium…A 
mere six decades after the Holocaust, you give legitimacy to a 
man who denies the murder of six million Jews while promising 
to wipe out the State of Israel, the state of the Jews…"34 
The danger posed by the Ayatollahs, similar to that posed by the Nazis, 
becomes even graver, both for the Jews and for the world as a whole, with 
the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon:
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.1.3
The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust: Israel, Iran, and the Shadows of Auschwitz
45
"This Iranian regime is fueled by an extreme fundamental-
ism…[I]f the most primitive fanaticism can acquire the most 
deadly weapons, the march of history could be reversed for a 
time. And like the belated victory over the Nazis, the forces of 
progress and freedom will prevail only after a horrific toll of blood 
and fortune has been exacted from mankind. This is why the 
greatest threat facing the world today is the marriage between 
religious fundamentalism and the weapons of mass destruction. 
The most urgent challenge facing this body today is to prevent the 
tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons…[T]he forces 
of terror led by Iran seek to destroy peace, eliminate Israel and 
overthrow the world order."35 
It is a gross mistake to think that the Israeli Holocaust-fuelled sense of 
threat which these words embody is "merely" about existential danger. 
Had that been the case, then the potential Israeli-Iranian nuclear crisis 
should have been amenable to classic realist interpretation and solution: a 
nuclear weapon on both sides will deter both sides; the balance of power, 
mutually assured destruction, will ensure stability. But this analysis fails, 
and monumentally so, in the case before us, in which there is a distinct 
possibility that MAD will not work since Israel, constantly analogizing 
threats through the Holocaust-prism, is convinced that the regime it faces 
is mad, to a degree that exceeds any irrationality that the West was willing 
to attribute to the Soviets, for instance. The Israeli decision-making pro-
cess regarding Iran maintains, practically as "certainty beyond evidence," 
that the Ayatollahs might be impossible to deter because they are willing 
not only to "bury" the enemy, in Khrushchev's words, but also bury them-
selves if that is the necessary price.36 
This perception is the most important manifestation of the Holocaust 
analogy in general and of Ben Gurion's Holocaust-laden nightmares in 
particular: the belief that the Iranian regime is indifferent to "sane" cost-
benefit calculations in its desire to destroy the Jewish state, as was Hitler, 
who diverted enormous resources in the midst of a total war to destroy 
the Jewish people. Already as Head of the Opposition, Netanyahu voiced 
fears that Iran possessing nuclear weapons "might use military action," 
and also "might be the first nuclear power that cannot be deterred. It is 
very easy to predict a messianic regime that is deterred by nothing, and 
that is a grave danger."37 The fundamentalist quip, according to which the 
believer wants to die more than the non-believer wishes to live, stands at 
the heart of the Israeli evaluation of the Ayatollahs' motives. As one Israeli 
scholar recently put it, one of Teheran's foundational insights is that "The 
West is reluctant to make self-sacrifices, whereas Iran (and the Muslims) 
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will be victorious because of their belief in martyrdom and jihad for the 
sake of Allah. The civilization which elevates the sublime objective over 
the value of the individual human life will prevail."38 
Given this image, the realist framework, its variations included, cannot 
accommodate the Israeli frame of mind. On the one hand, Realists have 
admitted the fragility of the balance of power in the face not only of fanat-
icism in general, but of Hitler's fanaticism in particular: Kenneth Waltz, 
the father of structural realism, "laments" Churchill's inability to gain 
power earlier "for he understood" the danger Hitler embodied; leading 
game theorists Emersion Niou and Peter Oredshook "sympathize" with 
the view that "Hitler's personality" was more "critical to the outbreak of 
World War II" than "some breakdown in traditional balance-of-power 
forces;"39 John Mueller exclaims that Hitler was single-handedly respon-
sible for World War II, since "after World War I" he was "the only person 
left in Europe who was willing to risk another total war."40 Yet on the 
other hand, Waltz also believes that a nuclear weapon would have 
deterred even Hitler, or at the very least, his generals;41 game theory 
holds that conservative calculations will prevail, and that "the prospect" 
that Iran would "take actions…that could invite its own destruction" is 
therefore "highly unlikely;"42 and Mueller has recently labeled Israeli 
comparisons between the Ayatollahs and the Nazis "extravagant," calling 
for a "calmer assessment" of Iran.43 
Whether or not these realist positions are empirically accurate, the 
chances that they will register with Israeli leadership are slim. No Israeli 
leader will ever concede that Hitler was willing to risk another World War 
but not the bomb. And, whether or not the comparison is indeed 
extravagant, it remains highly unlikely that any Israeli leader will commit 
to the idea that (what is believed to be) the contemporary incarnation of 
the Nazis will not use the bomb, either. Israeli warnings as to a possible 
strike against Iran must be understood in the context of such perceived 
Iranian fanaticism. The classic realist tendency is to take declarations, 
such as those by former Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff Shaul 
Mofaz, that "if Iran continues with its program for developing nuclear 
weapons, we will attack it,"44 as simply another part of the standard 
dynamic of deterrence attempts, similar to the combative Iranian 
reactions such statements provoke. But this standard realist 
interpretation is inadequate for handling a policy based on a Holocaust 
analogy that is anything but standard.
Consider, for example, the disparity between Israeli and American intelli-
gence regarding the question of when Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. 
Despite relying on the same material and frequently consulting one 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.1.3
The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust: Israel, Iran, and the Shadows of Auschwitz
47
another, in 2006 the Israelis predicted that Iran would need two years, 
while the Americans predicted five to ten years. John Negroponte, U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence, opined that: "sometimes what the Israe-
lis will do—and I think that perhaps because it's a more existential issue 
for them—they will give you the worst-case assessment."45 The problem 
with such explanations is not what they say but what they omit: India and 
Pakistan also have very obvious reasons to make the worst-case assess-
ments regarding each other's nuclear capabilities, but neither one of them 
believes the other is fanatic, as is the case with the Israeli perception of 
Teheran. Israel's worst-case assessment is therefore demonstrably worse 
than practically any other case, not least because of the fixed Holocaust 
analogy that is obviously not shared by other states, and that has already 
pushed Israel to strike against nuclear targets.
This claim for the distinctiveness of the Israeli posture does not deny that 
Israel also utilizes standard deterrence techniques—whether through dec-
larations of its willingness to attack Iranian reactors or through media 
attention to its development of a submarine-based second strike capabil-
ity. Rather, the emphasis is on the degree to which brinkmanship alone 
does not suffice for the perpetually psychologically-scarred Jewish state. 
Israel officially declares that President Ahmadinejad, presumably like the 
Iranian regime in general, "actively endorses chaos, so as to hasten the re-
emergence of the Hidden Imam and spread true Islamic rule worldwide. 
He believes that the Hidden Imam will return only following an apocalyp-
tic war against Israel and the West."46 And the practical implications of 
this Israeli belief can hardly be overstated. No second strike capability, no 
"breaking away from parity" with Iran,47 and not even firm backing by the 
world's strongest military power, can quell the pronounced Israeli fears of 
annihilation, and the sense that the enemy will pay any price to achieve its 
messianic goal.
But perhaps someone would claim that such a scenario remains 
extraordinarily unlikely exactly because of its dependence, emphasized 
throughout, on the lasting memory of the Holocaust. Instead of a 
conclusion, the discussion now turns to anticipate two sources for this 
objection: first, the linkage politics argument, according to which it is 
mainly domestic political needs that cause the framing of Iran in Nazi 
terms; and second, the notion that with the changing of generations the 
Holocaust's grip must have greatly diminished. Both of these claims, 
though intuitive, are misguided.
Nili: The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Journal of Strategic Security
48
The Holocaust Version of Linkage Politics
Rejecting the linkage politics argument does not mean rejecting the idea 
that Israeli leaders often paint external threats in demonic and existential 
terms due to domestic political needs.48 Much of Prime Minister Netan-
yahu's rhetoric regarding the "grave challenges posed to us" refers to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, though the Palestinians, as 
already noted above, do not in any way present Israel as a whole with an 
existential threat. It certainly does seem that in many cases such artificial 
expansion of security threats is meant to justify a "rallying behind the 
flag"—whether in the form of public support, or more concretely, in 
national unity governments which are meant to maintain incumbent lead-
ers in power, despite a turbulent and inherently unstable political system. 
Yet such manipulations depend upon rather than sustain a threat-based 
collective identity, whose roots remain inextricable from the Holocaust. 
No other society in the world, for example, has had its former Parliament 
Speaker declare (as late as 2008) that:
"The list of Shoah [Holocaust] manifestations in daily life is long. 
Listen to every word spoken and you find countless Shoah refer-
ences. The Shoah pervades the media and the public life, litera-
ture, music, art, education. These overt manifestations hide the 
Shoah's deepest influence. Israel's security policy, the fears and 
paranoia, feelings of guilt and belonging, are products of the 
Shoah…Sixty years after his suicide in Berlin, Hitler's hand still 
touches us…Israel naturalizes the Shoah victims who were dead 
even before we were born, embracing them into the bosom of the 
third State of Israel…[T]herefore our dead do not rest in peace. 
They are busy, present, always a part of our sad lives."49 
An outsider might wonder how, during more than sixty years, Israeli soci-
ety has not been able to develop a collective identity that does not revolve 
around the dead, and does not, as a result, engender permanent fears of 
collective doom. Any plausible answer must account for the profound 
identity crisis engulfing Zionist ideology. The Zionist project has lost its 
standing as a homogenous collective ethos.50 As a direct result, many sec-
ular Jews find it problematic to define their identity in a way that will 
explain why they should be Israelis rather than, say, Americans. Israel is a 
deeply fragmented society that often seems like it can only sustain a 
shared identity against a "significant"—and preferably deadly—"other." It 
is thus little surprising that "For many secular Jews," as Charles Liebman 
and Yaacov Yadgar recently noted, being Jewish has "little content other 
than the fact that they [are] not Arab."51 When outside threats are repre-
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sented in genocidal language, this is not a maneuver imposed upon an 
"unsuspecting" Israeli public, but rather an image that derives from this 
public itself.
The fixed Holocaust analogy, then, remains pervasive in Israeli conscious-
ness. That is the context in which one must read Israel's determination to 
stop Iran from reaching the bomb—despite a low probability of an effec-
tive strike, despite a very high probability of significant price, and even 
despite the obvious changes in "objective" geopolitical realities since the 
Holocaust.52 That is why the connection between the Air Force jets flying 
in Poland and the same jets that might fly to Iran is as profound as it is 
unique. Anyone who wishes to draw the future of the world's most dan-
gerous nuclear dispute must understand how omnipresent is the line 
drawn from Auschwitz to Natanz.
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